Most econometric studies of equity market integration suggest that national markets are increasingly becoming part of a global equity market. As regards the extent of this integration, however, the results are often inconclusive. Further analysis calls for a closer scrutiny of the basic requirements for perfect integration.
ROUTES TO EQUITY MARKET INTEGRATION -THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICIANS, INVESTORS AND MANAGERS

Introduction
Researchers and practitioners both tend to attribute today's economic crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America to the globalization of financial markets. It is assumed that existing or anticipated problems in a national market, previously handled by the government and central bank of the country concerned, are contagious and will spill over into the rest of the world. Investors act in their own interest, moving capital across national borders. Policy-makers can do nothing but look on; policy-making and regulations have lost their bite. At a time when capital controls have reappeared on government agendas, this popular view calls for a deeper analysis of the interplay between politicians, managers and investors, in order to see just how far globalization has actually gone. In the present global financial turmoil the results of such an assessment can make a crucial contribution to the search for appropriate policy prescriptions.
Over the last two decades a significant volume of research has focused on ways of measuring equity market integration from an econometric point of view. Various schools of thought have developed, but for most of them the point of departure has been much the same: the law of one price, which states that if two or more markets are integrated, then identical securities should be priced identically in them all. The controversial issue dividing the different schools concerns what "being priced identically" actually means.
One strand in the literature, which highlights identical movements, is based on the analysis of co-movements of equity-market returns (for the analysis of correlation of returns, see e.g. Eun and Shim, 1989; Hamao, Masulis and Ng, 1990; Lau and Diltz, 1994; Lin, Engle and Ito 1994 ; for correlation of hourly returns, see e.g. Susmel and Engle, 1994 ; for testing the stability of correlation coefficients, see e.g. Jorion, 1985; Kaplanis, 1988 ; for stability over longer periods, see e.g. Erb, Harvey and Viscanta, 1994; Ibrahimi, Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1995; Longin and Solnik, 1995;  and for stability around the Crash of 1987, see e.g. Roll, 1988; Bertero and Mayer, 1990; Arshanapalli and Doukas, 1993; King, Santana and Whadmani, 1994) . Solnik (1996) provides an overview of correlations between industrialized markets. This strand in the literature can be regarded as the main one. Whereas measuring co-movements in isolation leads to conclusions in terms of weak integration, measures of strong integration also involve the analysis of return gaps.
Most schools focusing on strong integration also start from the law of one price, but after risks have been taken into account. In studies adopting this more stringent definition of integration the thrust of the analysis can vary from the role of currency risk (see e.g. Jorion, 1989) , to the long-term differences in riskadjusted returns (see e.g. Ibbotson, Siegel and Love, 1985) , to optimal international asset allocation (see e.g. Glen and Jorion 1993; Odier and Solnik, 1993) , to international asset pricing with extended CAPM (see e.g. Black, 1974; Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977; Errunza and Losq, 1985; Eun and Janakiramanan, 1986; Hietala, 1989) , to home country preference bias (see e.g. French and Poterba, 1991; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar and Werner, 1995) , to the international pricing of risks (see e.g. Jorion and Schwartz, 1986; Gultekin, Gultekin and Penati, 1989, Harvey, 1991; Dumas, 1994) , to international asset pricing with extended APT (see. e.g. Cho, Eun and Senbet, 1986; Korajczyk and Viallet, 1989; Bansal, Hsieh and Viswanathan, 1993) , and finally to international asset pricing with consumption-based models (see e.g. Stultz, 1981; Wheatley, 1988) .
Taken together these studies point in the same direction: towards increasing equity market integration. But when it comes to the degree of integration, the results are often inconclusive, even in the case of comparable markets and periods. This claim is supported by Naranjo and Protopapadakis (1997) , who provide an overview of recent integration test results. The authors argue that the conflicting results may be partly due to the lack of an economic benchmark of integration with which the statistical tests can be compared.
In this paper I argue that before further progress can be made in measuring equity market integration, the fundamental prerequisites for integration to occur must be considered. The outcome of this initial step provides an economic benchmark per se. Then, once the extent to which these prerequisites have been met is fully recognized, it may be worth fine-tuning the measurement along the lines indicated above. The main benefit of focusing on the intricate interplay among politicians, investors and managers, and on the extent to which the fundamental requirements are met, is that it becomes easier to understand the sources of segmentation 2 and the probability of their changing. In this way it is also possible to get a better view of the inter-temporal variation in the degree of integration. The approach boils down to an analysis of market segmentation in terms of regulatory and informational wedges. Admittedly, though, this represents a threshold view, since the regulations that exist de jure may be ineffective de facto.
Fulfillment of the various prerequisites marks out different stages 3 on the way towards perfect equity market integration. The first prerequisite is the absence of capital controls that effectively prevent cross-border equity transactions -issues and trade. The second prerequisite concerns the efficiency of internal regulations and the absence of tax wedges and prohibitive transaction costs. The third prerequisite concerns the exchange of information and the absence of cross-border information asymmetries, including differences between corporate governance systems and information costs.
The process of integration as comprised by the fulfillment of these three prerequisites is assessed here in terms of the activities of three major stakeholder groups: politicians with their dual function of trying to retain control over capital flows 4 on the one hand and achieving a sound and safe financial infrastructure on the other; investors searching for profit opportunities; and managers trying to internationalize the cost of capital while maintaining control. The process of integration will be discussed below in terms of the complex interplay between these groups.
The paper presents a regional study of routes to equity market integration. The focus is on the Nordic region -Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 5 In view of the role played by politicians in traditional welfare states such as these, this choice can provide a chart of all the dimensions of the integration process. The region can be said to have the highest total tax burden in global terms, which also means that politicians influence a greater proportion of the expenditures drawn from GDP. Further, since the region is singularly free from intraregional barriers and enjoys a high degree of transparency, it is possible to concentrate on differences in the transformation of the equity markets of the different countries without having to control for differences in language, accounting principles or disclosure norms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the structure of the Nordic equity markets and the role they play in supplying companies with risk capital. Section 3 offers an analysis of attempts by politicians/regulators to influence the magnitude and scope of cross-border equity activities. Section 4 addresses such institutional and regulatory changes in domestic equity markets as are relevant to equity market integration. Section 5 analyses corporate efforts to eliminate cross-border information asymmetries by way of foreign listing and foreign capital market activities. Section 6 emphasizes defence against take-overs as a source of equity market segmentation. The main findings are then summarized in Section 7.
Nordic equity markets -their role as suppliers of risk capital
The embryos of the present Nordic national equity markets all go back a long way. 1915-1929 (high), 1930-1979 (low) and 1980-1992 (high) . Although the measure for the last period is far below that of the first, it still indicates a significant increase relative to the middle period, which was characterized by heavy regulation.
For all the Nordic countries there is support for a further division of the 1980-1992 into two parts, 1980-85 and 1986-92 . The data indicates a revitalization of the individual Nordic equity markets in the second period. After a peak in 1993-94 the issuing patterns changed. In Sweden, for instance, from 1994 to 1998 the total amount of public offerings, directed cash issues and new issues with preferential rights for existing shareholders fell from SEK 41 799 mill. to SEK 7 779 mill. The greater use of directed non-cash issues by listed companies in connection with the acquisition of large blocks of shares in other companies, mitigated the dramatic fall and signified a new issuing trend. A similar trend also appeared on the other Nordic equity markets.
Few econometric studies have been published on the link between the Nordic and the "global" equity market. After studying Granger causality and using monthly prices for the stock indices, Mathur and Subrahmanyam (1990) concluded that in the period 1974-85 the four Nordic markets were less than fully integrated.
Liljeblom, Löflund and Krokfors (1997) used monthly stock returns for the two sub-periods 1974-86 and 1987-93 and reported significant increases in stock market co-movement between the two.
Restrictions on cross-border equity activities
The Second World War was followed by a period when policy-makers believed the best way to heal the economic wounds of the war was to impose various forms of regulation on the financial markets. In this way they did their best to create cheap domestic financing in order to boost economic recovery.
For long periods at a time regulators and policy-makers wielded great influence over national Nordic equity markets. the Swedish "switch" system.
As can be seen in Figure 1 , the real take-off for the export of shares occurred around the middle of the 1990s. The figure provides us with an indicator similar to 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Copenhagen Helsinki Oslo Stockholm the measure of openness to international trade that is often used in the context of economic integration. Bigger cross-border capital flows at that time indicate growing equity market integration, coinciding with the implementation of the European Economic Area treaty in 1994. Table 1 provides a framework for a further analysis of Nordic equity market integration based on the timing of the Nordic regulation/deregulation of crossborder equity activities. Many of the issues included were regulated by the exchange controls, but many were subject to changes in practice by the Central Banks of the different countries and to changes in other legal arrangements such as Concessions Acts and Acquisition Laws. It should be stressed that collecting the data was a complicated task. Recent history is obviously of minor interest in a deregulating world, which has meant that the bulk of data used here has been generated by interviews rather than by the simple gathering of secondary data.
The dates under "Introduced" in Table 1 indicate when the current period of regulation started. The identification of this date as well as most of the dates given in the table should be approached with caution. In most cases the year given is the year in which exchange controls were introduced. Subsequent to that year the regulation/deregulation pendulum may have swung back and forth a couple of times before a steady route towards deregulation was embarked upon. The dates under "eased" are key dates on the way to a deregulated market. However, it is not always possible to identify an individual year in which deregulation occurred.
Instead there was generally a period during which policy-makers or central bankers started to show a more relaxed attitude towards cross-border equity activities. In such cases a period rather than an individual year is given in the table. Finally, the dates under "abolished" indicate the year when restrictions on the right to carry out a particular activity were abolished. But even after that date there may still be some restrictions on the way the activity is conducted. A frequent example of this was that the acquisition of foreign shares by domestic investors had be done through a domestic broker and the shares had to be kept in domestic custody. The policy-makers' increasingly positive attitude towards equity meant that even foreign companies were willing to list their shares on the Nordic stock exchanges. A-list 1980-1985 and total list 1986-1999. In this section we have seen that, with respect to the prerequisites for equity market integration, most barriers to cross-border equity activities with Nordic markets had been relaxed by 1999. What remained were restrictions imposed for tax reasons on the way these activities are to be conducted. The lifting of restrictions on cross-border activities has boosted the interest of foreign investors in Nordic companies as well as arousing an interest among foreign companies to list on the various Nordic equity markets. Altogether this indicates that perfect equity market integration -from a capital-flow point of view -could be expected to prevail. The complex interplay between Nordic politicians/regulators, corporations and foreign investors also seems likely in a general way to have contributed to the bridging of potential cross-border information gaps, thus adding to an all-encompassing form of equity market integration.
Internal regulations and institutional changes
The internal regulatory bodies in the Nordic countries deal with the regulation of the operations of the financial system and the tax legislation relating to capital gains tax, wealth tax, tax on dividends and tax on traded securities. One important way of promoting government control over the development of equity market integration has been by influencing debt/equity ratios. In addition to tax-related policy changes, three ways of favoring debt financing can usually be distinguished: by exerting control over the development of stock markets, over the extent to which financial and non-financial companies are owned by the government, and over the granting of financial assistance to companies through a variety of subsidized credit facilities.
However, the Nordic authorities have typically influenced the balance between the various sources of capital through their tax policies. For most of the post-war period equity financing has been more expensive for companies than credit financing. To be able to pay a dividend in a sustainable way a company must show a profit on which tax has to be paid, whereas the costs of credit financing are taxdeductible. Since the countries in the Nordic region can all be classified as "political economies" with very high tax burdens, it is easy to understand why the interest tax shield has been very attractive for long periods at a time. At the beginning of the 1980s the debt ratios in two of the Nordic countries -Finland and Norway -were close to the Japanese level, while in the other two countries the levels were slightly above the European average. By the end of the 1990s, however, the ratios of all the Nordic countries had converged to the "OECD" average.
The equity euphoria at the end of the 1980s led some governments to impose new taxes on equity. In 1988 a 1 percent turnover tax on equity trading was introduced in Norway. The tax was very short-lived and was lifted at the end of the year. In the other Nordic countries similar efforts persisted longer. In Denmark the authorities in certain circumstances charged a fee of 1 percent of the market value of traded shares. Finland imposed a 1 percent tax on the amount traded on the stock exchange and 1.6 percent on the amount traded outside it. In addition there was also a stock exchange fee of 0.05 percent (maximum FIM 500). In Sweden both buyers and sellers had to pay a tax of 0.5 percent of the amount traded.
During the 1980s Nordic policy-makers gradually moved towards eliminating incentives that favored loans rather than equity. However, as was noted in OECD (1991), at the beginning of the 1990s all the Nordic countries showed tax wedges when company and personal income taxes were both taken into account. All these wedges were above the EU average, and in all cases except Sweden above the In addition to the tax laws and the restriction on financial operations there are internal measures of a corporate governance kind that are important to the functioning of equity markets. As we will see in a later section, there are restrictions on companies buying back their own shares, that is to say trading in their own shares as opposed to making a redemption, and it is obligatory to publish major increases in the stakes in a company.
The EU proposal of "one share-one vote" is also being currently debated. To avoid conflict and to eliminate arbitrage opportunities emanating from different supervisory subsystems, a merger of the various national supervisory institutions into one for each country was carried out in the Nordic countries at the beginning of the 1990s (Oxelheim, 1996) .
In this section we have seen that, with respect to the prerequisites for equity market integration, Denmark and Sweden, with their more or less full double taxation of dividends, deviated at the end of the 1990s from the other Nordic countries and from the global trend. In addition, as political economies the Nordic countries all exhibit wedges relative to the benchmark tax rates of the "global" market also when it comes to taxes on capital gains and, except in the case of Denmark, to taxes of wealth. As well as these residual causes of equity market segmentation, there are also inefficiencies generated by the complex interplay between politicians/regulators and managers. These causes of segmentation, which will be addressed in Sections 5-6 in a managerial perspective, are largely due to differences in corporate governance systems. One such cause arises from the gap between Nordic disclosure norms and the requirements formulated by the Security Exchange Commission. Another cause connected with the same area lies in the lax attitudes of Nordic politicians to the dual voting system.
Corporate efforts to bridge cross-border information gaps
The corporate efforts to close cross-border information gaps and to internationalize the cost of capital can be combined in many different strategies, but two main ingredients do emerge: listing the company's shares on one or more foreign stock exchanges and/or directing equity issues to investors in one or more foreign countries. Modén and Oxelheim (1997) analyze the international equity issues by Swedish firms between 1981 and 1995 and show that the information factor (financial and commercial marketing) ranked highest among the reasons that lay behind these issues. Although the two main ingredients mentioned above are generally combined in the strategy chosen by the individual companies, I will discuss them separately below.
In most companies the corporate strategies for bridging the information gap represent a gradual process. This is demonstrated in Figure 3 . A company that wants to avoid a failure to raise capital on its target market can follow the long route shown on the left of the figure, gradually gaining experience and recognition. Novo, the first Nordic company to raise capital on the US market in the post-war period, and thus lacking any immediately relevant experience, followed the route in the middle of the figure. In the 1990s most large companies started with a listing on the target market or let listing and issue occur simultaneously, thus following the routes to the right in the figure. Further, most of these companies opted for more than one market, as evident by their choice of a euro-equity issue.
Bridging cross-border information gaps by listing abroad
In the 1980s Nordic firms became increasingly interested in cross-listing. Before 1980 no Finnish companies were listed abroad, while four Danish companies, one Norwegian and eleven Swedish companies were listed on international stock markets. The practice differed across countries. Danish companies were predominantly listed on one market only, whereas Swedish companies were typically listed in several market places. In the Nordic context, the Swedish companies Ericsson and Swedish Match were represented on the greatest number of exchanges. Of Ericsson's eleven markets, three were in Switzerland. Swedish Match was listed on ten exchanges, of which five were Swiss. Norsk Hydro, listed on eight markets -three of which were Swiss -came third in this respect.
Common to all these Nordic companies was their considerable size, and all -with a few Danish exceptions -were manufacturing companies.
A large number of Nordic companies were listed on stock exchanges abroad during the period 1980-1999 (see Table 3 ). This occurred either with or without simultaneous equity issues. In recent years international cross-listing has occurred in special shares of the foreign firm (known as depositary receipts or DRs).
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are the publicly traded security in the USA. Three levels of ADR exist depending on (1) whether they are traded on the over-the-counter market (level-one) or (2) are exchange-listed without raising new capital (level-two) or (3) the same but with such an issue (level-three). If a company is admitted for listing it must be able to support initial and continuation fees as well as the cost of meeting the disclosure requirements. The LSE has been the most popular market place for cross-listing in all the Nordic countries. In the later 1990s, however, the US markets Nasdaq and NYSE have been catching up. This shift in preference can be explained by a legal change that allows companies with dual shares to list, and by expectations about the market value created by a listing on the US exchanges. The US information requirements as formulated by the Security Exchange Commission are very demanding, which means a great leap forward in terms of bridging the cross-border information gap for such Nordic companies as can manage to meet them. At the end of the 1990s another conspicuous feature was that even quite small companies were daring to embark on cross-listing.
The widespread use of shareholder value analysis at the end of the 1990s may explain a de-listing practice that can be observed, for instance in presence of Swedish companies on the other Nordic stock exchanges. As was noted above, listing on many exchanges may be part of a learning process and a strategy for acquiring global recognition. But once this recognition has been earned, the greater focus on the cost of capital as part of the shareholder value analysis, and the high cost of supporting a multiple listing strategy, may motivate de-listing. Table 4 provides an idea of the incidence of equity issues directed abroad by Nordic companies. It shows the total volume of such issues, as well as their percentage of the total issues of companies in the individual countries. For the first four decades of the post-war period the Nordic equity markets were segmented markets with low liquidity. Hence, there were strong arguments for companies in the Nordic countries to opt for internationalizing their cost of capital. Modén and Oxelheim (1997) show that cross-listing is not enough; a simultaneous issue is necessary if the company is to signal its strong commitment. To secure this and to avoid eroding the wealth of existing shareholders (if the issue were placed on thin and inefficient markets), once they got started Nordic companies opted primarily for the US and UK markets.
It should be noted, and taken as a word of warning, that for a number of reasons an analysis of the relative importance of equity issues abroad is associated with severe data problems. In a country like Denmark the data gathering boils down to a search for mention of such issues in annual reports. The Danish authorities show no particular interest in registering cross-border issues. Some aggregated data can be found for the other countries. However, the mode of reporting differs from country to country, which has meant looking for ways of making the data compatible.
Moreover, it has not been possible to make any distinction between public issues and issues directed to one or a couple of investors. Convertible bond issues are excluded. A further registration problem concerns the emergence of euro-equity issues, and the fact that directed issues are becoming increasingly blurred and harder to identify. One reason is that the foreign investors' rate-of-return requirement and savings can be obtained in the home market. Hence, the opening up of Nordic national equity markets to foreign investors should to some extent have reduced the need for issues abroad directed to that category for purely capital-market reasons. Table 4 captures the change of issuing behavior by including from 1996 onwards also non-cash directed issues. The entry of foreign investors operates as a catalyst and a "pull" mechanism in the process of making the national equity market part of the "global" equity market. In the case of perfect equity market integration, directed issues with a view to internationalizing the cost of capital should eventually amount to zero. However, other reasons for undertaking equity issues abroad, such as product marketing, remain. The low level of interest in foreign equity issues shown by Danish firms (see Table 4 ) may reflect our previous observation that Danish regulators have been liberal in their attitude to cross-border equity activities for many decades. Perhaps, due to this, Danish companies were already part of the global market and had no need to invest in internationalizing their cost of capital? No, the explanation is rather to be found in the size distribution of Danish firms, whereby small and medium-sized firms predominate. This explanation is supported by the fact that Danish firms were involved in foreign issues during the second half of the 1990s; that is to say after they had had the opportunity to benefit from the fund-raising speaks for an increase in the relative importance of foreign equity markets.
The first post-war issue abroad by a Finnish company was undertaken in 1982.
The issuer was Kone and the issue was directed to the Swedish market. The choice of market was based on other grounds than cost-of-capital arguments. Sweden continued to be the most popular market for Finnish equity issues abroad for some years. In 1983 Kone, Nokia and Wärtsilä directed issues towards the Swedish market. The two biggest issues that year, however, were a euro-equity issue (Finnish Sugar) and an issue aimed at the US market (Instrumentarium). In terms of amounts raised through international equity issues, 1984 and 1986 were the peak years of the 1980s.
In the mid-1980s Finnish banks started to show an interest in raising capital abroad through directed equity issues: Union Bank of Finland (1985 and and KOP (two issues in 1988 aimed at two institutional foreign investors, Japanese Nippon Life and Swedish Proventus). By 1987 the big paper and pulp companies were starting to issue abroad: Kymmene (Finland's most important export company at the time) and United Paper Mill. In 1988 Enzo-Gutzeit raised capital through a euro-equity issue.
Between 1989 and 1992 issues directed to foreign investors were low. However, the lifting of restrictions on foreign ownership of Finnish companies, effective from 1 January 1993, triggered a revival of this way of raising capital. In 1993, Nokia raised capital through an issue directed to major financial centers, and Huhtamäki through two foreign issues. In 1994, there were eight issues. Nokia The decline in interest in cash issues on the part of Swedish firms as from the late 1980s is not too puzzling, in view of the abolition in June 1986 of the provision in the Swedish capital controls that required foreign financing for direct investments abroad. As reported in Oxelheim (1990) , the management of the 20 largest Swedish multinationals in 1985 found this provision to be a major obstacle.
A feature shared by all the Nordic foreign equity issues -euro-equity and those cash issues directed to a particular foreign market -is the changing size over time of the companies involved. In the 1980s, the companies involved more or less all belonged to the national top-20 groups. In the 1990s, the companies that dared to embark on the venture of raising capital abroad all belonged to the national top-100 groups in terms of market capitalization. Pharmaceutical firms were conspicuous among the first out. High levels of intangible assets (and low levels of collaterals) forced this sector to look for new equity rather than loans. Their capital needs relative to the size of the domestic market made foreign equity issues more or less the only alternative.
With respect to the prerequisites for equity market integration, this section has indicated the existence of a two-tier integration. In each of the Nordic markets a block of companies exists that is continuously under scrutiny on the global market. These predominantly large corporations in each one of the Nordic countries have spent big amounts of money on breaking away from their origins in countries with highly regulated and segmented equity markets. They have been richly rewarded for their efforts in terms of global recognition. The cross-border information gap has been closed and they have consequently managed to achieve an international cost-of-capital level (see Oxelheim et al., 1998) . This block is more or less perfectly integrated with the global equity market, whereas many of the companies outside it have found themselves too small to afford an international marketing campaign with a view to closing their own cross-border information gaps. The size distribution of Nordic firms indicates that the integrated block of companies is relatively larger in the Swedish equity market than in the other Nordic equity markets.
The bulk of companies listed on the Nordic markets still suffer from cross-border information asymmetries, and still belong to a part of the market that is segmented. The indirect information effect for these companies, stemming from the potential interest of foreign investors due to the greater market knowledge they have gained from investing in larger and well-recognized Nordic companies, will only mitigate this situation to a limited extent. A similar pull effect could also arise as a result of foreign companies listing on the Nordic markets. However, Modén and Oxelheim (1997) reported that a more active approach can create value. When listing and issuing abroad occurred simultaneously, companies experienced an 11 percent positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the fiveday period following the announcement of the decision to undertake these operations.
Corporate efforts to maintain control
As can be seen in Table 5 , even though external and internal deregulation had both proceeded at a great pace, there was still plenty of scope towards the end of the 20th century for the managers of Nordic companies to maintain control and thus to influence share prices. When take-over defenses are mobilized, they give rise to segmentation by creating a wedge between the actual price of risk in a particular company and the global price of that risk. Dullum and Stonehill (1990) report findings from an analysis of take-over defenses used in the restructuring of global industries as a result of a conflict between two paradigms, namely the Corporate Wealth Maximization framework and the Shareholder Wealth Maximization framework. The authors found that a number of take-over defenses were being used in the Anglo-American markets.
Among the most common were 1) going private by way of a leveraged buy-out; 2) finding a "white knight"; 3) creating a "poison pill"; 4) granting "golden parachutes" to existing management; 5) changing a firm's corporate charter to require qualified voting on mergers and staggered elections for the board of directors; 6) accusing the take-over entity for anti-trust violations or a breach of the securities laws; 7) paying "greenmail"; and 8) proposing a plan for voluntary restructuring to be carried out by existing management.
A comparison between the findings displayed in Table 5 and similar findings for seven non-Anglo-American countries as reported in Dullum and Stonehill (1990) A comparison with Dullum and Stonehill's results shows that the most frequently used defense measure (i.e. used in all 7 of their countries studied), namely relying on a network of close personal relationships, is losing in importance. The second two most frequently used measures that they found were the use of dual classes of voting stocks and the selling of a special issue of voting shares or convertibles to "stable" or "friendly" investors (adopted in 6 of 7 countries). The first of these two defenses is still commonly used, but is declining in importance in all the Nordic countries, whereas the second is not common. Forming a strategic alliance and/or having interlocking boards of directors (as in 5 of 7 countries) is frequently found in Norway and Sweden, but is not common in the other two Nordic countries.
Regulations associated with take-over defenses are also reported in Table 5 . They are all aimed at improving the safety and soundness of the financial system, and they work in the direction of increased equity market integration by enhancing transparency and reducing the impact of remaining take-over defenses. As we noted in Section 4, one area that has experienced tougher regulation is the obligation for investors to disclose major increases in their stake in a company.
Levels at which the disclosure should take place are legally specified.
In terms of our prerequisites, we can say that the complex interplay between politicians/regulators and managers in the area of prudential issues has generated a weak trend towards increased equity market integration. However, most Nordic companies still have some leeway for protecting themselves, and thus stopping a take-over attempt based on a perceived mis-pricing of the company's share. This also means that hostile take-overs are still unlikely to play an important part in the restructuring process triggered by the current trend towards regionalization and increased integration. 
Concluding remarks
From extensive econometric attempts to estimate the extent of equity market integration it has emerged that the markets are neither segmented nor fully integrated. This paper emphasizes the need for a further analysis of the actual causes of segmentation. The "benchmark" case of perfect integration should meet three prerequisites: no cross-border barriers to equity activities, no internal barriers or distorted tax incentives and no cross-border information asymmetries over and above the company-wise asymmetries. Once these requirements can be said to be fulfilled, the last step will be for the econometricians to test whether or not currency and political risks have been properly priced relative to the global standard.
The few published econometric studies of Nordic equity market integration (Mathur and Subrahmanyam, 1990 and Liljeblom, Löflund and Krokfors, 1997) indicate an increasing degree of integration between 1974 and 1993. The empirical observation noted in this paper, based on the complex interplay between politicians/regulators, investors and managers in each individual Nordic market, indicates a strong two-tier integration. The Nordic markets as a whole are not perfectly integrated, but a segment of the market consisting of large companies exposed to detailed scrutiny on the global market, comes very close to it. In a broader perspective, this suggests that econometric studies of integration based on indices are exposed to the "ban of the arithmetic mean", and should be interpreted accordingly. The conflicting results discussed in the introduction may be explained to some extent by differences in terms of the proportions of small and large companies covered by the chosen indices.
As regards barriers to cross-border equity activities, the Nordic markets can be said to have concluded their transition from a state of heavy regulation to become integrated parts of the "global" equity market. Remaining restrictions concern the way an activity is conducted. Since the reason behind these restrictions is taxrelated, they should be associated rather with the category of internal barriers and incentive-distorting measures.
Although the relaxation of taxes on unit trust savings and/or the tax relaxation on dividends and capital income often get the credit for the improvement in the functioning of the Nordic equity markets, a closer examination produces evidence that the general tax structure prevailing in the four Nordic welfare states contributes to segmentation. This is particularly obvious in the case of Sweden (the most liquid of the four markets) with its decision in 1995 to reinstall the full double taxation of corporate dividends. Hence, the second group of prerequisites is not fully met in any of the Nordic countries.
As regards the third category of prerequisites to be met for perfect equity market integration, there still seem to be cross-border information gaps in the Nordic case. Corporate investor relations and investment activities suggest that these gaps are gradually going to be closed. Cross-border listing and issues, and international road shows put on by Nordic companies are examples of active measures of the "push" kind, while foreign companies investing (FDI) or looking for risk capital in the Nordic area, and foreign investors' portfolio investment in the area, are all examples of "pull" measures. Indirect pressure on the harmonization of the information content of local companies with that of global companies will also ensue, when domestic investors start investing abroad to an increasing extent.
An issue that calls for further research concerns the extent to which the malign tax incentives still in operation in the Nordic area affect the level of equity integration of the group of genuinely international Nordic companies. Remaining tax-wedges will have to be modeled in some way or another when the time comes for an econometric test of Nordic equity market integration. Further research should also focus on the mis-pricing contingent on the remaining cross-border gaps between corporate governance models and the scope for the Nordic companies to withstand hostile take-over attempts on the part of foreign and domestic firms.
Together with the ongoing globalization of equity markets, the change of attitude among Nordic policy-makers and regulators has triggered a topical debate: should the Nordic national markets form a common Nordic market (like a "refuge"), or should they be allowed to take part in the creation of an EU market place? A joint Nordic market place would be the fourth biggest in Europe in terms of market capitalization. A first step in the direction of co-operation was taken in 1990 with the establishment of NORDQUOTE, which collects and disseminates real time information from each of the four Nordic exchanges via satellite. As a second step a Nordic strategic market alliance was established at the end of the 1990s in response to a corresponding development in other parts of Europe. The alliance -NOREX -is between the Copenhagen and the Stockholm Stock Exchanges, with an option for the Oslo and Reykjavik Stock Exchanges to join. The Helsinki Stock Exchange has chosen to join a European alliance (EUREX) with Frankfurt as its core, thus preventing for the present, from an institutional point of view, an approach towards a single Nordic equity market.
Notes
